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ARGUMENT 
I. Pace Has Correctly Stated the Proper Standard for Summary 
Judgment, and Factual Issues Exist That Preclude Summary 
Judgment• 
LRP has contended that Pace has "conveniently" omitted or 
misstated facts, skewing them in his favor, and that Pace has 
misstated the standard for summary judgment. The facts that LRP 
refers to, particularly the statement that an LRP employee was the 
"lead man on this job", speak to LRP's supervision over Pace. Any 
conflicting factual disputes surrounding the relationship between 
LRP and Pace show that summary judgment was inappropriate, as such 
conflicts must be resolved in favor of Pace, the nonmoving party. 
Pace has made no effort to avoid or "omit" LRP's characterization 
of the facts, but rather has exercised his right as the nonmoving 
party to present the facts in a light most favorable to him. 
As to the correct standard for summary judgment, Pace 
acknowledges that when the nonmoving party presents opposing 
evidence that is insufficient as a matter of law, summary judgment 
is warranted, even when the issue concerned normally cannot be 
resolved at summary judgment. See, e.g.f Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow 
Irr. Co., 813 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1991); Sorenson v. Hartford Accident 
and Life Ins. Co. , 585 P.2d 440, 441-42 (Utah 1978); see also, 
Hussev Gay & Bell v. Georgia Ports Authority, 420 S.E.2d 50, 52-53 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1992) . This requirement makes sense in that it 
ensures the bona fides of a dispute. 
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LRP appears to claim that there was no bona fide dispute here 
because Pace has failed to present evidence of any factual 
conflict. In doing so LRP relies on a strained reading of Ghersi 
v. Salazar, 883 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1994). LRP contends that Ghersi 
held that the nature of the employment relationship could be 
determined on summary judgment, and in so arguing notes that Ghersi 
"specifically" rejected Novenson v. Spokane Culvert & Fabricating 
Co., 588 P.2d 1174 (Wash. 1979)(which held that employment 
characterization issues are not normally resolvable on summary 
judgment) and "explicitly" held that facts concerning the terms and 
manner of the employment relationship could be determined on 
summary judgment. 
This is not so. Ghersi cited Novenson with a "but see" signal 
to illustrate that there are instances when an inference from the 
facts and circumstances is inappropriate because the facts and 
circumstances themselves are a subject of dispute (the Novenson 
opinion does not reveal whether all of the circumstances 
surrounding the worker's employment were undisputed, as the Ghersi 
opinion did). The facts in Ghersi were undisputed. One may make 
inferences from undisputed circumstances on summary judgment—that 
is what Ghersi concludes. One cannot, however, resolve factual 
disputes and then make inferences from the findings. 
Here there are disputes that cannot be resolved at summary 
judgment, evidence of which is certainly sufficient to create a 
bona fide dispute. One dispute already mentioned concerns the 
amount of control LRP could exert over Pace. Another is whether 
2 
LRP paid workers' compensation premiums.1 LRP claims that evidence 
of such payment was readily available to Pace. It is not Pace's 
duty to prosecute LRP's defense. The only evidence of any kind in 
the record of payments between LRP and ELI is that referred to in 
Pace's initial brief. LRP produced nothing else, neither to Pace 
or the district court. If there were such evidence, it is not in 
the record, and that is LRP's fault.2 
II. LRP Has Not Met the Three Ghersi Criteria Required for LRP 
to be Immune. 
A. There Was No Contract Between LRP and Pace. 
Pace has argued that there was no contract, express or 
implied, between LRP and him because the elements of contract did 
not exist. LRP suggests that an "implied" contract does not need 
those basic elements: offer, acceptance and consideration. LRP is 
wrong. There must be an offer and an acceptance, even of an 
implied contract between a special employer and employee, because 
1
 With respect to payment of premiums, LRP has attacked Pace's 
interpretation of Ghersi, arguing that the payments made from the 
special employer to the general employer in Ghersi did not include 
any pro rata allocation for workers' compensation. Language from 
Ghersi refutes LRP's argument: "Huish [special employer] paid an 
hourly fee to Adia [general employer] with the understanding that a 
portion of the fee would be used to purchase workers' compensation 
insurance for the temporary employees." Ghersi, 883 P.2d at 1358. 
Huish was bound to pay Adia under contract, so even if Huish made 
payment after the accident (a fact unclear from the opinion), it was 
still bound with the contractual obligation to do so. No such 
contractual obligation existed in this case. 
2
 Thus, to LRP's contention that Pace has made an ipse dixit 
denial, Pace responds inopia non curat lex (the law does not remedy 
a dearth). 
3 
the employee is relinquishing his right to sue the special employer 
by entering into it. Ghersi, 883 P.2d at 1357. Choice is the 
criterion emphasized in Ghersi. and an act of acceptance evidences 
such choice (even if merely implied) . Pace did not choose to work 
for LRP. 
LRP cites no cases in which choice prevailed over submission 
(apart from Ghersi. in which the choice was obvious and part of the 
entire temporary employment relationship). In contrast, Pace has 
cited cases that paint a spectrum between choice and submission. 
The cases indicate that Pace submitted to ELI and did not choose to 
work for LRP. Bourette demonstrated submission (instruction to 
help with repairs), as did Fisher (one cannot "choose" to work for 
an undisclosed special employer). Submission is key: "[Control or 
right to control the servant's physical conduct] must create a 
relationship of subordination between the borrowing master and the 
borrowed servant rather than a relationship of cooperation." 
Pichler v. Pacific Mechanical Constructors, 462 P.2d 960, 963 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1969)(no control by special employer found—servant 
on site per general employer's instructions). 
Pace had to do what he was told by ELI. So did the workers 
in the above cases and in the other cases that Pace cited. He did 
what he was told, and did so when requested by his general 
employer. Such conduct is not unusual—it is expected. LRP has 
failed to show that Pace had the choice to enter into any kind of 
contractual relationship with LRP. 
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B. The Work Was Not Essentially That of LRP. 
Pace argued in his initial brief that his work was not 
"essentially" that of LRP because it benefitted ELI. The Larson 
treatise requires exclusivity, and LRP's position fails absent 
exclusivity. LRP disagrees, ascribing a colloquial meaning to the 
term "essential" instead of the technical meaning given the term in 
the Larson text. LRP's argument is unfounded. As pointed out in 
Pace's initial brief, Professors Larson coined the use of the term 
"essential" and also authored the exclusivity premise. If Larsons 
use the terms interchangeably, then LRP must also. If LRP really 
wishes to wax philological (unlikely), then one could argue that 
"essential", coming from the root "essence", really means 
elemental, which connotes exclusivity. But there is no point in 
speculating how many meanings can dance on the language of the 
statute, since the law is clear on this point. Essentially means 
exclusively. 
C. LRP Did Not Have the Right to Control Pace. 
LRP cites a number of cases, including Avila v. Northrup King 
Co., 880 P.2d 717 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994), for the proposition that 
LRP had the right to control Pace. Avila simply got the law wrong. 
It stated, 
[I]n the non-labor contractor cases, where an 
employer merely loans an employee and does not provide 
special equipment, the majority rule is that the loaned 
employee becomes the employee of the special employer. 
IB Larson, supra, § 48.23, at 8-515. Consequently, even 
in the absence of a labor contractor relationship between 
EMCO, Avila, and Northrup, substantial precedent exists 
for holding that Avila is a lent employee of Northrup. 
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Avila, 880 P. 2d at 724. Below is reproduced the section of the 
Larson treatise cited by Avila (italicized section is text that 
occurs on page 8-515). 
§ 48.23 General employer in business of furnishing 
employees 
The closest cases are those in which the business of 
the general employer consists largely of the very process 
of furnishing equipment and employees to others. When, 
for example, a truck owner furnishes trucks and drivers, 
or cranes and operators, at a profit to himself for the 
regular use of the special employer, it might at first 
seem that the bulk of the work being done is that of the 
special employer, and special employers have been held 
liable in these circumstances. Sometimes this result is 
produced in part by the fact that the special employer 
alone possesses a license to engage in interstate 
hauling. In a South Carolina case, Jordan Motor Lines 
leased a truck and claimant driver to defendant Coker 
Freight Lines. Coker had a license to operate in 
interstate hauling; Jordan did not. The ICC regulation 
of November 23, 1956, under which Coker operated stated 
that every lease of vehicles "Shall provide for the 
exclusive possession, control, and use of the equipment, 
and for the complete assumption of responsibility in 
respect thereto. . . ." 
The court, relying heavily on the responsibility so 
assumed under ICC rules, held Coker to be a special 
employer. The amount of control exercised by Coker does 
not seem to have gone beyond specifying cargo, 
destination and route. But the responsibility legally 
assumed by Coker under the ICC regulation supplied the 
main basis for the decision. 
But it is also possible to say that the owner is 
advancing his own business, which is simply the business 
of furnishing such equipment and labor for profit, and, 
particularly when the facts show ultimate retention of 
control for the protection of expensive equipment, it is 
quite common to find the general employer remaining 
liable. 
If, however, the general employer merely arranges 
for labor without heavy equipment, the majority of the 
cases hold that the worker becomes the employee of the 
special employer, although there is substantial contra 
authority. For example, employers obtaining workers from 
the kind of labor service typified by Manpower, Inc. have 
usually, but not invariably, been held to assume the 
status of special employer. 
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IB Arthur Larson & Lex Larson, Larson's Workmens' Compensation Law 
§ 48.23, at 8-496 to 8-532 (footnotes omitted)(hereinafter 
"Larson"). 
It is obvious that the Avila court cited Larson out of context 
and misapplied and misconstrued Larson's language. Section 48-23 
deals specifically with "labor contractors" (suppliers of temporary 
or leased employees), and does not apply to "non-labor contractor 
cases" as Avila states. Indeed, every one of the 43 cases cited by 
Larson in footnote 65 in support of their "majority rule" argument 
is a labor contractor case, as are the 18 contra cases cited in 
footnote 65.1. It may be that footnotes were the log tripping the 
Avila court: they are so voluminous that in section 48.23 they take 
up all of pages 8-497, -498, -499, -500, -501, -502, -506, -507, -
509, -510, -511, -512, -513, -514, -516, -517, -518, -519, -520, -
521, -523, -524, -525, -526, -527, -529, -530, and -531. It is no 
wonder that an attorney or judge could miss the central theme of 
the section—"General Employer in Business of Furnishing 
Employees"—when the text is so disjointed. 
LRP cited Avila and the other cases accompanying it—Sorenson, 
Nation, Rivera, Rodriguez, and Blacknall—in an effort to liken 
this case to Ghersi. All of the cited cases, however, are just 
like Ghersi in that they concern temporary employees lent by labor 
contractors or providers. They do not bridge the gap between the 
situation in Ghersi, where the right to control by the special 
employer was obvious, and the situation here, where it was not. 
The fact that the borrowed servant obeys the requests of 
the borrowing employer as to the act involved does not 
necessarily cause him to be the servant of such borrowing 
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employer. Such obedience indeed may be obedience to a 
noncoercive request of the borrowing employer or the 
request may be in the nature of information given to the 
borrowed servant in a cooperative effort to get the job 
done. 
Pichler v. Pacific Mechanical Constructors, 462 P.2d 960, 963 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1969). 
Answering LRP's specific contentions, LRP did not have the 
right to control where, when and how Pace was to carry out his 
assignment, since the assignment was made by ELI and specified its 
location and content. As noted above, the "lead man" 
characterization is a subject of dispute, and the contention of 
LRP's president that Pace was under LRP's exclusive supervision and 
control is self-serving and incredible. 
In short, non-labor contractor cases like this one require the 
application of the enumerated criteria, as argued in Pace's initial 
brief. Such analysis leads to the conclusion that LRP was not an 
employer immune from tort liability. 
III. The Joint Employment Doctrine Does Not Apply. 
LRP, citing Araaon v. Clover Club Foods, 857 P.2d 250 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) , claims that it and ELI are so interrelated that 
they should be treated as "joint employers." This case is nothing 
like Araaon, or its predecessor, Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co. , 386 
P.2d 616 (Utah 1963). In Aragon a parent was found to be a joint 
employer with it subsidiary; in Cook two joint venturers who were 
helping each other build a tunnel were found to be joint employers. 
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While ELI and LRP do share a symbiotic relationship, they are 
different businesses, and can in no way be characterized as 
partners or joint venturers in the same sense as the companies in 
Cook or Aragon. ELI's success does not necessarily mean success 
for LRP, or vice versa. They are not linked in a "joint effort", 
Aragon, 857 P.2d at 256, nor does one ultimately control the other 
(as does a parent over a subsidiary) or have a substantial voice in 
the other's dealings as to the joint objective (as is the case in 
a partnership). See Hammer v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 510 P.2d 1104, 
1105 (Utah 1973)(joint venturers are akin to partners in a 
partnership).3 
Finally, LRP contends that Pace could not be a "stranger to 
the employment" because LRP "at times" borrowed Pace. LRP misreads 
Aragon. Only a "stranger to the employment" may be amenable to 
suit; an employee may always sue that stranger. Aragon, 857 P.2d 
at 255. A tortfeasor can be a stranger—a victim cannot. LRP 
presumably wishes to contend that LRP cannot be a stranger to the 
employment because it "at times" borrowed ELI employees, among them 
Pace. But this is not true. LRP is a stranger to the employment 
because it is not an employer or employee under the statute. If it 
wishes to prove that it is an employer under the statute and avoid 
being a stranger (its apparent goal), then it must show more than 
frequent borrowing. As has been demonstrated, it has not. 
3
 Pace has argued that LRP did not pay Pace's workers' 
compensation benefits, a factor important to the Aragon court's 
decision. Aragon, 857 P.2d at 256 (parent always is the ultimate 
payor of subsidiary's workers' compensation coverage). 
9 
IV. The Lee Affidavit Should Be Stricken. 
With respect to LRP's contention that Mr. Lee's assertions 
concerning the employment relationship were proper and admissible, 
the untenability of LRP's position is clear: 
[T]he fact that Rivera's affidavit asserted that he had 
no employment contract with Sagebrush and that he had not 
been told he would be considered Sagebrush's employee for 
purposes of the Act does not change [the result that 
there was an implied contract of hire between Sagebrush 
and Rivera]. See, e.g.. [English v. Lehigh County Auth., 
428 A.2d 1343, 1354 (Penn. Super. 1981)] (characterization of relationship by worker or employer 
does not control determination of whether employment 
relationship exists). 
Rivera v. Sagebrush Sales, 884 P.2d 832, 835 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1994)(emphasis supplied). 
As for LRP's argument that the best evidence rule need not be 
satisfied with respect to payment records, it is once again not 
Pace's duty to prosecute LRP's defense. The supporting documents 
(if any) should have been attached to the affidavit as exhibits. 
Otherwise, Lee's statement violates the best evidence rule. This 
is true even if Lee could establish foundation that he knew what 
was in the documents. The best evidence rule can be violated— 
indeed, is probably often violated—with testimony that has plenty 
of foundation (i.e., "I have looked at the check seven times, and 
the 'memo' portion said 'haircut.'"). Such testimony is simply not 
good enough when the document is available. Lee's statement 
violates the rule. 
10 
CONCLUSION 
LRP has argued that it enjoys immunity, either under Ghersi or 
Aragon. LRP relies on testimony that is inadmissible and glosses 
over significant factual disputes. Moreover, Aragon does not apply 
to this case because LRP and ELI are not sufficiently related. 
Ghersi's criteria apply, and LRP satisfies none of them. LRP did 
not have the right to control Pace, there was no contract of hire 
between LRP and Pace, and the work that Pace was doing was not 
essentially that of LRP. LRP's arguments to the contrary lack 
authority and speculate rather than substantiate. This case is not 
like Ghersi. and on that basis the district court should be 
reversed.
 ; 
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